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Improving and sustaining production efficiency of small farmers under the dominance of borrowing constraints 
require the improvement of access to credit among other factors of production. Although there has been a substantial 
literature on credit rationing in developing world, there is surprisingly little information on the characteristics of 
farmers who are likely to be affected by the factors identified to be the credit constraints. Therefore, using data of 
171 respondents from the household survey, the research provides new evidence on credit rationing and borrowing 
constraints for rural farmers in Nigeria. The estimates of the logistic regression model reveals that constraints to 
credit is negatively related to educational attainments of the farmers and positively correlated with high off-farming 
business. Based on the findings, the study recommends the need for the policy makers to strengthen the lending 
capacity of rural credit markets, redesign the educational system and encourage micro businesses in the rural areas. 
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1.  Introduction 
Credit is regarded as one of the apparatus of financial services considered important in all production 
activities. Generally, there has been a growing awareness on the importance of farm credit as an instrument for the 
development of agriculture, particularly its impact on the financial structure in the production unit (Barry & 
Robison, Dicken, 2007: 2001; Omonona, Lwal, & Oyinlna, 2010).  
Part of the reason why farm credit is increasingly getting momentum in many economies, is as a result of 
the response to the demand of micro entrepreneurs, specifically small holder farmers and rural dwellers who has 
limited access to financial services. For the past decades, development scientists such as Von Pischke and Adams 
(1979) elucidate that the inability of the rural farmers to access farm credit undoubtedly has adverse consequences 
on income earning, farming production, and more importantly the rural welfare. Therefore, inaccessibility of farm 
credit may lead to lack of acquiring necessary inputs for farming that may distort the entire production process 
through the multiplier effect leading to vicious circle. Consequently, in order to achieve the sustainable development 
for a given economy, the human, natural and physical capital which also called traditional composition of capital 
needs to be extended to include poor households (Omonona et al., 2010; Serageldin, 1999). Growing empirical 
literature suggests that social and human capital were among the element of sustainable development. Therefore, 
consideration is being given to the importance of social and human capital on the welfare of the families and the 
level of development of nations and economies. In this regard, Lawal, Omonona, Ajani, and Oni (2009) establishes a 
positive relationship between access to credit and social capital among the rural farmers. 
It is well understood that demand for farm credit differ according to varying attributes of the individuals. 
Nonetheless, the difference between the demand for credit and its corresponding supply indicates a clear 
demarcation that some degree of credit constraint exists among the households. However, Nagarajan, Meyer, and 
Hushak (1998) expounds that the wider the difference, the higher the level of credit constraint. Thus, constraint to 
credit could be seen as a difference between excess demand and shortage credit supply due to lack of capital by the 
lenders (Atieno, 2001), information asymmetric (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), transaction cost (Boucher, Guirkinger, & 
Trivelli, 2009; Guirkinger & Boucher, 2008) and attributes of the households (Kofarmata, Applanaidu, & Hassan, 
2014).  Thus, Omonona et al., (2010) defined credit constraint as the condition on which an individual cannot avail 
the desired credit for production at the prevailing market price.  
Growing research from the empirics advocates that in developing economies, lack of credit have substantial 
negative consequences on farm profit (Carter, 1989), output (Feder, Lau, Lin, & Luo, 1990) and farm investment 
(Omonona et al., 2010). Moreover, the prevalence of constraints to credit in developing nations like Nigeria and its 
effect on production has led to insufficient agricultural production. Empirical evidence from southern Nigeria 
indicates that aggregate social capital index (meeting attendance, membership, decision making), experience, 
amount of loan requested, collateral availability and cash contribution positively and significantly reduces credit 
constraints one hand. On the other hand, production of cash crops such as cocoa increases credit constraints status of 
the farmers (Lawal et al., 2011). Similarly, Omonona et al. (2010) found that 79 percent of the sampled respondents 
were credit constraint in Nigeria, and that some demographic attributes (age, gender and marital status), human 
capital and asset (years of education and household head income), farm attributes (land acquisition and farm size), 
and institutional attributes (number of contact with extension worker) are the major determinants of credit 
constraints by the households. But the percentage of credit constraints households is much more severe in Ghana 
where Bigsten, Collier, and Dercon (2003) reported 90 percent of the small firms and households are credit 
constraints with respect to institutional loan, owing to their inability to secure collateral. In a study conducted in 
U.S., Netherlands and Italy, Crook and Hochguertel (2005) found that younger individual and low income earners 
are likely to be credit constraint. However, they elucidate that much of the loan applications are being rejected in the 
U.S. in comparison to Netherlands and Italy. Besides, in different studies conducted in South Asia, America and 
Africa by Yu (2009) and Jappelli (1990) and more recently by Koomson, Annim, and Peprah (2014) reaffirmed that 
financial attributes of the households such as wealth, income and savings are the major determinants of credit 
constraint.  
However, going far within the literature, this current research has noticed that previous studies has put 
more weight on household’s financial attributes as a possible factors that can shed light on the credit constraints 
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status of the household. Other factors such as human capital indicators and household carrier that receive little 
attention in the past has been acknowledged in this study. Moreover, econometric modelling of these variables in the 
context of the study area has been very rear. With this in mind, this paper seeks to analyse the determining factors of 
credit constraints in agricultural credit market in rural Nigeria. The paper is divided as follows; while Section 2 and 
Section 3 contained methodology and findings, Section 4 and Section 5 are the conclusions and some policy 
reflections.  
2.  Methodology 
2.1  Data 
A three-stage random sampling method has been used for the selection of the respondents in the study area. 
This involves the random selection of the three local governments from the three agricultural zones in Kano State of 
Nigeria at the first stage. Namely Kura, Dambatta and Wudil Local Governments from Zone 1, Zone 2 and Zone 3, 
respectively. While the second and third stages of sampling procedure are the selection of the local wards and grass 
root farmers from these three local governments. Based on the registered farmers in these areas, 57 respondents 
were selected from each of this three local government making a total of 171 respondents. And vital information 
necessary for the study were collected from them through the questionnaire. 
2.2  Econometric Model   
It has been established in the literature that regression with qualitative dependent variable could best be 
handle with the binary regressand models. In this case Probit model, since the dependent variable is a response to 
the qualitative questions on credit constraint status of the farmers with 1 representing unconstraints and 0 for the 
constraints farmers. Following Ai and Norton (2003) and (Papatla and Krishnamurthi (1992), the model is presented 
in Equation [1]. 
                  [1] 
Where   is not observed, however, we do observe  
                 [2] 
If   includes an intercept, zero threshold is a normalization that is of no consequence as in Greene (2012). 
Specifying the model in Equations [1] and Equations [2], we therefore have 
                [3] 
                  [4] 
                   [5] 
Where  is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of . If  is standard normally distributed, this will 
yields the normit model popularly known as probit model. Conventionally, we have to set  in the probit 
model, so as to impose restrictions and to exceptionally define the scale of  in the model. Following this 
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normalization the empirical model is presented below in Equation [6]. 
[6] 
Where AGE is the age of the farmers in years, AGE2 is the age squared, DEP is the number of dependents 
per household, SEC is the dummy taking a value of 1 for secondary school attendant and 0 otherwise, TER is binary 
variable taking a value of 1 for tertiary school attendant and 0 otherwise, EXP is the household’s years of farming 
experience. CVS is dummy variable taking a value of 1 for civil servant, SEM is also a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 for self-employment and OFF represents off-farming income. It is hypothesized that the probability of 
being credit constraint decreases with an increase in household wealth and age (Hayashi, 1985; Jappelli, 1990; 
Zeldes, 1989) and increases with number of family (Mariger, 1986).  
However, human capital indicators such as education could be positively related with some awareness 
regarding institutional credit, and therefore less likely to be intimidated by lending agencies(Muhammad, 2003; 
Sebu, 2013; Storey, 1994). It is expected therefore to be less credit constraints. Similarly, households with self-
employment or being part of the township leadership is likely to demand credit in order reinvest in more productive 
ventures and therefore less likely to be constraints households (Li, Li, Huang, & Zhu, 2013).  
3.  Discussion of Results 
This section of the paper discussed the socio-economic attributes of the farmers in the study.  Analysis of 
the estimates from the Probit model and the corresponding marginal effects has also been discussed. 
3.1  Attributes of the Farmers in the Study Area 
As indicated in Table 1, the mean age of the farmers in the study is 35.15. This indicates that majority of 
the farmers in the study area are economically active within their productive age. The estimated average number of 
dependent per household head is 7. This implies that farmers may hire less labour while benefiting from the 
abundant family resource. It may also be viewed from different perspectives that households with more siblings are 
likely to battle with an increase in expenditure that may possibly affect investment decision.  
Table 1. Household Attributes 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
AGE 35.15 9.888 20 50 
DEP 7.222 7.275 1 41 
EXP 19.04 12.55 1 50 
OFF 149,123 157,879 50,000 700,000 
Note: $1=N220 
 
Interestingly, the average years of farming experience is 19 which signifies the managerial capability to 
most of the farmers regarding production decision. Similarly, the average off-farming income is $677. 83 
(N149,143), on which together with the savings from farming ventures may likely be enough for farmers to reinvest 
in more productive activities, making them to be less credit constraints. 
As indicated in Figure 1, there seems to be a wide difference between constraints and unconstraints farmers 
within the age cohort with respect to income. The mean off-farm income for 50 years of age within the unconstraint 
farmers is far higher than their cohort in the constraints category. However, with an inception of this, the mean off-
farm income for constraints farmers is little higher than their counterpart. More surprisingly, Figure 1 depicts that 
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  Figure 1.             
 Mean of off-farming income by age and credit constraints conditions 
3.2  Regression Analysis 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, Probit model was used in this paper to analyse the factors responsible for 
credit constraint status of the farmers in the study area. The maximum likelihood estimates of the econometric 
model as presented in Table 2 yields an interesting findings. The strength of this Probit robust estimates was 
validated by the significant of the Wald x
2 
at 2 percent (prob> x
2
 = 0.024). Similarly, the likelihood ratio test for 
model selection has favoured estimates from the probit model over the nested model as indicated by the significant 
of the Lr x
2
 (1) =4.50 at 3 percent (prob> x
2
 = 0.033). 





AGE 0.047 0.017 
 (0.096) (0.035) 
AGE2 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
DEP 0.270* 0.098* 
 (0.142) (0.050) 
SEC 0.315 0.114 
 (0.301) (0.108) 
TER 0.670** 0.242** 
 (0.318) (0.111) 
EXP -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.006) 
CVS -0.534* -0.193* 
 (0.292) (0.102) 
SEM -0.238 -0.086 
 (0.312) (0.112) 
OFF 0.275** 0.100** 
 (0.129) (0.045) 
Constant -3.737*  
 (2.033)  
Wald x
2
 19.09 171 
Prob> x
2
 0.024  
Pseudo R2 0.0653  
Note: Credit constraints is the dependent variable taking a value of 1 for unconstraint and 0 for constraints. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 




Four out of nine coefficients of the probit estimates are significant at different levels. These are DEP, TER, 
CVS and OFF as indicated in the credit constraints model in Table 2. In addition, the average marginal effects of 
these estimates are also obtained for better understanding on the effects of these variables on constraints status. As 
evidence from Table 2, the positive marginal statistical significant of DEP indicates that an increase in one family 
member increases the chances of being unconstraint borrower by .098 percentage points. This implies that more 
members means more connections, therefore, farmers of this nature are likely to benefit from their social network, 
and their loan applications are likely to succeed on one hand. On the hand, lenders are more willing to release farm 
credit to households with more members in order to benefit from the abundant chief labour that can lessen the cost 
of production. This contradicts the findings of Omonona et al. (2010) and Koomson et al. (2014), but in agreement 
with the result of Doan, Gibson, and Holmes (2010). 
Similarly, human capital indicator was found to be very promising by the statistical significant of TER at 5 
percent. The positive sign of this coefficient infers that a unit increase in the level of education increases the 
probability of being unconstraint farmer by 0.242 percentage points. This suggests that farmers with higher 
educational qualification are likely to utilize their education to become more informative with regard to credit source 
and loan procedure. And by virtue of their qualification they are likely to be the favourable banks’ clients. Similar 
result was reported by Girma and Abebaw (2015) and Omonona et al. (2010), but contradict the finding of Sebu 
(2013) that household with more years of schooling is unlikely to apply for loan.  
However, the negative statistical significant coefficient of CVS at 10 percent predicts that those in 
government administration are less likely to become unconstraint borrower, but more likely to become constraints 
farmers. It follows that any additional promotion will decrease the chances of farmer to apply for loan by 0.193 
percentage points. This suggests that civil servant has additional chance to engage in different productive business 
that might make these type of farmers more economically stable that may decrease their demand for loan. This 
finding is consistent with results of Papias and Ganesan (2010) and Tang, Guan, and Jin (2010), but disagree with 
Mpuga (2010) and Li et al. (2013). 
As expected and hypothesized, the positive and statistical significant coefficient of OFF at 5 percent 
implies that a unit increase in off-farm income increases the chances of being credit unconstraint farmer by 0.10 
percentage points. This result suggests that some kind of credit may be needed by this type of farmers to finance big 
projects on one hand. On the other hand, credit worthiness is associated with high income earners and lenders 
favours customers with higher capabilities of repayment. This is similar with the position of Crook and Hochguertel 
(2005) and Yu (2009).  
4.  Conclusions 
This paper contributes on the analysis of farmers’ access to farm credit particularly highlighting more on 
the credit constraints status of the rural households, using a micro level farm data sourced from the household 
survey. Precisely, the paper examined the determinants of household’s being credit constraints. The econometric 
credit constraints model shows that farmers with little or no off-farm income and less educated ones together with 
those at the administrative cadre are likely to be denied loan. Therefore, these type of farmers stand at high risk of 
being credit constraints compared to more educated with income from different sector. Unlike previous study, this 
study concludes that households with more dependence (siblings) are also likely to be included in the determination 
of agricultural credit market.  
5.  Policy Reflections 
The study suggests that appropriate educational adjustment is needed to incorporate more rural farmers by 
given them more access to educational system. This structural educational arrangement could include the provision 
of part time classes and adult literacy programs. However, the fact that only 24.15 percent get farm credit, the study 
recommends the need to strengthen the lending capacity of the lenders in order to supply more credit to the rural 
households. By addressing this issue, rural farmers might have access to farm capital that will be reinvest and 
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